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PRODUCTS LIABILITY—CONFLICT PREEMPTION: 
REWRITING THE TEST FOR IMPOSSIBILITY:  THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT REMOVES THE PROTECTION OF 
THE LAW FOR GENERIC DRUG RECIPIENTS 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. CT. 2567 (2011) 
ABSTRACT 
Originating in Minnesota District Court and Louisiana District Court, 
respondents in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing were drug recipients who argued the 
generic drug manufacturers of Reglan had a duty under state tort law to 
provide adequate warning labels detailing the risks associated with the 
medication.  The United States Supreme Court held Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) regulations imposed on generic drug manufacturers 
make it impossible for the generic manufacturers to comply with both state 
and federal law.  Additional pertinent facts regarding this case are identified 
in Part I of this article.  Part II details the extensive legal background 
surrounding both preemption and the FDA.  Further, Part III describes the 
generic manufacturers’ argument that they cannot unilaterally change their 
warning labels because of FDA regulations, in which the majority of the 
Court agreed. Thus, the respondent’s claim was preempted by federal law.  
This 5-4 decision, overruling the Eighth and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
creates a new standard for the conflict preemption defense of impossibility 
and draws a dramatic distinction from the Supreme Court’s previously 
decided conflict preemption case in 2009.  Finally, Part IV analyzes the 
devastating nationwide impact of this opinion including the allowance of 
the protection of the law for those who receive name-brand prescription 
medications but denial of that protection to generic recipients.  While some 
have characterized this decision as the decision that makes little sense, the 
Court contends generic drug recipients have simply been dealt an 
“unfortunate hand.” 
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I. FACTS 
Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy each began taking the generic 
version of Reglan, metoclopramide, in 2001 and 2002, respectively.1  After 
taking the generic version for several years,2 as provided by their 
pharmacists, each developed tardive dyskinesia.3  This severe neurological 
disorder develops in up to twenty-nine percent of patients who take 
metoclopramide for several years.4  In response, each individually brought 
suit against the manufacturer of the generic medication.5  The plaintiffs, 
Mensing and Demahy, argued the company, PLIVA, Inc., was liable under 
their respective state tort laws—Minnesota6 and Louisiana7—for failing to 
provide adequate warning labels.8 
In both suits, the defendant, PLIVA, Inc., argued state tort claims were 
preempted by Food and Drug Administration regulations and federal 
statutes which mandated them to use the same “safety and efficacy 
labeling” as their name-brand equivalent.9  The Minnesota District Court 
agreed with the drug company’s arguments and granted summary judgment, 
but the Louisiana District Court held the tort claim was not preempted by 
federal law.10  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, “declin[ing] 
to assume that Congress intended to shield from tort liability the 
manufacturers of the majority of the prescription drugs consumed in this 
 
1. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2569 (2011). 
2. Id. at 2572-73.  The warning labels associated with Reglan and its generic counterpart has 
undergone changes since 1985 when the label was modified to mention tardive dyskinesia.  Id. at 
2572 (citing PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 1635-36 (41st ed. 1987)).  Most recent changes 
include a black box warning indicating “[t]reatment with metoclopramide can cause tardive 
dyskinesia, a serious movement disorder that is often irreversible . . . . Treatment with 
metoclopramide for longer than 12 weeks should be avoided in all but rare cases.”  Id. at 2573 
(citing PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 2902 (65th ed. 2011)). 
3. Id. at 2573.  Tardive Dyskinesia is defined as “involuntary movements of the facial 
muscles and tongue, often persistent, that develop as a late complication of some neuroleptic 
therapy, more likely with typical antipsychotic agents.”  STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 598 
(28th ed. 2006). 
4. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2572 (citing McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 
2006); Douglas Shaffer et al., Tardive Dyskinesia Risks and Metoclopramide Use Before and After 
U.S. Market Withdrawal of Cisapride, 44 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASSN. 661, 663 (2004)). 
5. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2573. 
6. Id.  “[W]here the manufacturer . . . of a product has actual or constructive knowledge of 
danger to users, the . . . manufacturer has a duty to give warning of such dangers.”  Frey v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. 1977). 
7. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2573.  “[A] manufacturer’s duty to warn includes a duty to 
provide adequate instructions for safe use of a product.”  Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 
254, 269-70 (5th Cir. 2002). 
8. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2573. 
9. Id. 
10. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 07-3919, 2008 WL 4724286, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 
2008); Demahy v. Wyeth, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 642, 662 (D. La. 2008). 
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country and leave injured parties like Mensing no legal remedy.”11  In a 
similar fashion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated, “[t]here is no 
evidence sufficient for us to say that it was the ‘clear and manifest purpose’ 
of Congress to preempt state law, or to allow the FDA to do the same.”12  
Thus, the generic manufacturers appealed the decisions, which were heard 
as a consolidated lawsuit before the United States Supreme Court.13 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In order to understand how PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing14 shapes both law 
and policy, one must study a variety of historical and legal factors.  Those 
issues involve the current federal regulations concerning prescription drug 
certification, the constitutional basis of preemption, and the significant and 
binding precedent that shaped the PLIVA, Inc. decision.  Together, current 
drug regulations, legal theories surrounding preemption, and precedential 
authority create a legal background referenced throughout the PLIVA, Inc. 
opinion. 
A. THE EXPANSION OF GENERIC DRUG CERTIFCATION 
In 1906, state regulations and common law liability for “adulterated or 
misbranded drugs” were codified by federal statutes.15  In response to rising 
concerns regarding unsafe drugs and fraudulent marketing, Congress put 
forth another substantial step toward drug regulation by creating the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).16  In 1962, the FDCA was 
considerably amended to require manufacturers of new drugs to prove they 
are safe, effective, and have accurate warning labels.17  The original 
modification by Congress included all types of drugs, regardless of their 
manufacturer.18 
However, in 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, formally known 
as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, loosened 
 
11. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 612 (8th Cir. 2009). 
12. Demahy v. Actavis, 593 F.3d 428, 449 (5th Cir. 2010). 
13. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2572. 
14. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
15. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009); see Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 
59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1934)), repealed by Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 902, 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938). 
16. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195.  See generally Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-
717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
17. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2574.  These amendments are typically referenced as the 
Kefauver-Harris Amendments.  Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102, 76 Stat. 780, 781 (1962) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  Current law still places a duty on the manufacturer 
of a name-brand drug to prove its safety and efficacy.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006). 
18. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2574. 
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the standards required for certification of a “generic drug.”19  A generic 
drug, defined by the United States Supreme Court in 1983, refers to a “drug 
designed to be a copy of a reference listed drug (typically a brand-name 
drug), and thus identical in active ingredients, safety, and efficacy.”20  The 
amendments allowed for drug certification after showing the generic drug is 
equivalent to drugs already approved and the warning labels are identical.21  
Notably, the amendments encompassed no language expressly preempting 
state tort claims22 nor did they expressly preserve state tort claims through a 
savings clause.23  While these laws have undergone additional revision in 
2007,24 the main events of PLIVA, Inc. took place prior to 2007.25  
Therefore, the applicable law in the decision does not include the 2007 
Act.26 
B. INTERPRETING FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
The paramount issue in PLIVA, Inc. involves whether the regulations of 
the FDA that apply to generic drug manufacturers preempt, or directly 
conflict with, state law claims.27  The United States Supreme Court has 
routinely held federal regulations can have the same preemptive effect as 
federal statutes.28  Traditionally, courts give deference to the view of an 
agency with regard to the impact of their regulations on state law.29  
Therefore, the FDA’s views are controlling unless plainly erroneous, 
inconsistent, or reflect unfair and uncertain judgment.30  Recent United 
States Supreme Court precedent further articulated this standard by 
indicating while an agency’s interpretation of its regulations receive 
deference from the court, the agency’s conclusion regarding whether state 
law should be preempted does not receive the same deferential treatment.31 
 
19. Id. 
20. Id. (citing United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 454-55 (1983)). 
21. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
22. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2586 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
23. Id. at 2577 n.5 (majority opinion). 
24. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 
823 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
25. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2574 n.1. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 2572. 
28. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982). 
29. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2575 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997)); 
see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 496 (1996). 
30. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2575 (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461-62). 
31. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009). 
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C. PREEMPTION:  THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND 
The origin of the preemption rule is in Article VI of the United States 
Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, which establishes federal law as the 
“supreme [l]aw of the [l]and.”32  Although the United States Supreme Court 
has recently heard multiple preemption cases, the preemption defense was 
historically unsuccessful until 1992.33  While there are many types of 
preemption defenses, a court’s decision regarding them traditionally lies in 
the interpretation of non obstante34 provisions.35  In PLIVA, Inc., the 
defense asserted by the manufacturing company involved a specific type of 
conflict preemption called impossibility.36 
1. The Various Types of Preemption Defenses 
“[P]reemption entails far more than the idea that federal law prevails 
over state law in cases of conflict.  Instead, preemption typically involves a 
decision to displace state law in some area in order to advance perceived 
federal policy goals.”37  In making a decision to displace a set of laws, 
courts categorize preemption defenses by type: express preemption, field 
preemption, and conflict preemption.38 
First, “[e]xpress pre-emption requires explicit pre-emptive language.”39  
To qualify as express preemption, Congress must have enacted specific 
statutory language addressing the question of displaced federal laws.40  
However, if no express language exists to create an express preemption 
scenario, field or conflict preemption may still allow for the displacement 
of state law in support of public policy.41 
Second, field preemption is determined by a “manifestation of 
congressional intent” to occupy an entire field of law, such that state 
regulation in that area is preempted.42  The final type of preemption, 
 
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
33. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 505 (1992) (indicating preemption is a 
valid defense in regards to a state personal injury action in which federal law prevented any legal 
remedy). 
34. See discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
35. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2579-80. 
36. Id. at 2577-80; see discussion infra Part II.C.1. (defining impossibility). 
37. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 729 
(2008). 
38. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992); Hillsborough Cnty., 
Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). 
39. Gade, 505 U.S. at 115 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation 
& Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983)). 
40. Merrill, supra note 37, at 729. 
41. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2577 & n.5. 
42. Gade, 505 U.S. at 115 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204). 
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conflict preemption, occurs when accomplishing both state and federal law 
is impossible, or when state law becomes an obstacle to the purposes and 
intentions of Congress.43  While express preemption is the preferred 
preemption category for courts when settling disputes regarding conflicts of 
law, if a finding for express preemption cannot be found, courts seek to 
determine if either field or conflict preemption may serve as a valid 
defense.44  In PILVA, Inc., after eliminating the defense of implied 
preemption, the Court found conflict preemption existed.45 
2. Non Obstante Provisions:  Repealing State Laws 
In the eighteenth century, legislatures used non obstante provisions to 
indicate if a new statute should repeal any potentially conflicting laws.46  
However, current legislatures use non obstante provisions in a different 
manner than in the eighteenth century. 47  A current non obstante provision 
indicates a new statute may contradict prior law.48  The provision also 
instructs the courts “not to apply the general presumption against implied 
repeals.”49  Therefore, harmonizing conflicting laws has historically been a 
priority of courts in order to avoid implied repeals.50 
After considering the framer’s intent, the Court in PLIVA, Inc. 
determined the non obstante provision in the Supremacy Clause indicates 
federal law should be understood to “impliedly repeal conflicting state 
law.”51  The United States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in 
2009, at which time it held a court should not interfere with federal law to 
accommodate a state law of inconsistent nature.52  Although the Court 
interprets the meaning of the non obstante provision in the Supremacy 
Clause in a similar manner in 2009 and 2011,53 striking differences in the 
remainder of its preemption analysis exist. 
 
43. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
44. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2577 & n.5. 
45. Id. 




50. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2580; Doolittle v. Bryan, 55 U.S. 563 (1853); Ludlow’s Heirs 
v. Johnson, 3 Ohio 553, 564 (1828); Warder v. Arell, 2  Va. 282, 296 (1796). 
51. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2580. 
52. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1187 (2009). 
53. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2580; Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1187. 
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3. Conflict Preemption:  Impossible Compliance 
The primary function of the Supreme Court when analyzing a 
preemption issue is to determine whether state laws and regulations remain 
consistent with the goals of federal law.54  In instances where state and 
federal law “directly conflict,” federal law must have priority.55  Therefore, 
if a private party cannot possibly comply with both state and federal 
requirements, there is a federal law conflict that may give rise to the defense 
of impossibility.56  The current test for impossibility used in both PLIVA, 
Inc. and Wyeth v. Levine57 is “whether the private party could independently 
do under federal law what state law requires of it.”58 
D. INFLUENTIAL PRECEDENT:  APPLICATION OF PREEMPTION 
While a wealth of case law dealing with both warning labels and 
preemption defenses apply to the issues in PLIVA, Inc., the United States 
Supreme Court relies heavily on two judicial opinions.59  The first opinion, 
Wyeth v. Levine, was decided in 2009 by the United States Supreme 
Court.60  Because the Wyeth decision also addresses federal preemption in 
the context of prescription drugs, it is frequently referenced in the PLIVA, 
Inc. decision.61 
In Wyeth, a woman was prescribed and took an anti-nausea drug, 
Phenergan, for migraine treatment.62  However, her treatment resulted in 
gangrene and the amputation of her forearm.63  The drug recipient argued 
the Phenergan label did not adequately warn her of the dangers associated 
with the medication.64  Yet, in a 6-3 opinion, the Court held it was not 
impossible for the drug manufacturer of a name-brand drug to comply with 
both state and federal warning label laws.65 
 
54. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
55. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2577; Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1205; Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). 
56. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2577 (citing Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 
(1995)). 
57. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
58. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2579.  This test began to develop when the United States 
Supreme Court held in 2009 that no preemption defense existed where the defendant could 
“unilaterally” meet the requirements of state law.  Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199. 
59. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2577; Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1205. 
60. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1187. 
61. See PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2577. 
62. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1208. 
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An additional influential case is Rice v. Norman Williams Co.66  In 
Rice, the Supreme Court unanimously held the Sherman Act67 did not 
invalidate California law regarding the sale of spirits.68  In so holding, the 
Court articulated a concept referred to as “hypothetical impossibility.”69  
Hypothetical impossibility is frequently cited as a tenet of preemption 
analysis by many courts, including the Court in PLIVA, Inc.70  Therefore, 
Rice pronounced a potential conflict does not demonstrate impossibility of 
following both state and federal law.71 
III. ANALYSIS 
The issue presented in PLIVA, Inc. depended upon “whether federal 
drug regulations applicable to generic drug manufacturers directly conflict 
with, and thus pre-empt, these state-law claims.”72  By means of a 5-4 
decision, the Court held the generic drug manufacturers could not satisfy 
their state duties without the “federal government’s special permission and 
assistance.”73  Therefore, state law may be preempted if a party cannot 
independently comply with both state and federal law.74  The Court 
addressed two main arguments in support of its conclusion:  (1) the generic 
drug manufacturers had avenues to change their warning labels, (2) and 
possibly conflicting federal laws should preempt state law.75 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Justice Thomas authored the majority opinion in PLIVA, Inc., in which 
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Alito joined in full and 
Justice Kennedy joined in part.76  The majority opinion addressed the 
various methods the generic manufacturers could have used to change their 
warning labels.  Additionally, the majority focused on the new standard for 
impossibility as conflict preemption and the impact this decision has on 
older preemption rulings.77 
 
66. 458 U.S. 654 (1982). 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
68. Rice, 458 U.S. at 661. 
69. Id. at 659. 
70. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2587 (2011). 
71. Rice, 458 U.S. at 659. 
72. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2572. 
73. Id. at 2581. 
74. See id. 
75. Id. at 2570. 
76. Id. at 2571. 
77. Id. at 2570-71. 
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1. Avenues for Changing Generic Drug Labels 
Mensing and Demahy argued preemption is an invalid defense because 
the generic drug manufacturers had the capacity to potentially change their 
warning labels.78  The respondents argued three avenues existed to change 
the generic warning label including:  (1) “changes being effected” (CBE), 
(2) “Dear Doctor” letters, and (3) FDA consent.79 
First, Mensing and Demahy argued an FDA-approved CBE process 
allows manufacturers like PLIVA, Inc. to alter their warning labels when 
needed.80  Specifically, they advocated the process allows manufacturers 
who have already received FDA approval to strengthen or add precautions 
and warnings,81 and to add instructions about administration and dosage, 
which will facilitate safe use of the medication.82  However, the FDA 
contended a generic manufacturer may only change their drug labels “to 
match an updated brand-name label or to follow the FDA’s instructions.”83  
Additionally, the FDA interpreted CBE changes made unilaterally by a 
generic drug manufacturer to violate other FDA statutes and regulations.84  
Because the longstanding policy of the Court is to grant deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, the Court concluded, in a 
matter that corresponded with the FDA, that the generic manufacturers 
could not initiate the CBE process.85 
Second, the injured drug recipients argued the manufacturers could 
have sent additional warnings to physicians and other prescribing health 
care professionals through the use of “Dear Doctor” letters.86  However, the 
FDA again received the Court’s deference with their opinion that such 
letters would qualify as labeling unapproved by the FDA.87  The FDA 
further suggested such letters may mislead physicians to imply a difference 
in the therapeutic benefit of generic versus name-brand medications.88  
 
78. Id. at 2574. 
79. Id. at 2575-77. 
80. Id. at 2575.  The CBE process has seen discussion throughout various cases with quickly 
changing analysis.  Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharmaceuticals Co., 630 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1994). 
81. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2006). 
82. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(C). 
83. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2575. 
84. Id.  Other FDA regulations indicate a generic manufacturer’s approval and certification 
may be withdrawn if the label is no longer equivalent to the label of name-brand drugs.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(G) (2006); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.94(a)(8)(iii), 314.150(b)(1). 
85. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2575. 
86. Id. at 2576. 
87. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(m); 21 CFR § 202.1(1)(2)). 
88. Id.  FDA regulations allow for the withdrawing approval of generic drugs if the labeling 
of the drug is “false or misleading in any particular.”  21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(3). 
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While this effect would violate the FDA’s terms of certification for 
manufacturers, it would also be contrary to the FDA’s goals and 
objectives.89  Accordingly, the Court advised that federal law does not 
permit generic manufacturers to increase the strength of their warnings 
through “Dear Doctor” styled letters.90 
Third, the FDA asserted the generic manufacturers could have, and 
were legally required to, propose stronger warning labels if necessary to 
protect the health and safety of drug recipients.91  Additionally, if the FDA 
agreed with the generic manufacturer that a labeling change was appropri-
ate, it would have cooperated with the name-brand manufacturer to create a 
new warning label for both drugs.92  However, PLIVA, Inc. argued that no 
duty of notification to the name-brand manufacturer exists on behalf of a 
generic drug company.  They further contended no evidence exists of a 
generic drug manufacturer ever acting in a way that may be in accordance 
with any such duty.93  Despite differing opinions regarding the legal duty to 
notify a manufacturer of unsafe products, the Court concluded “[b]ecause 
we ultimately find pre-emption even assuming such a duty existed, we do 
not resolve the matter.”94 
2. Possibly Preempt:  Hypothetically Conflicting Laws 
After bearing consideration on the suggested avenues for changing 
prescription drug labels, the Court deciphered how the options of the 
generic drug manufacturers’ impact their conflict preemption defense.95  
Initially, the Court clarified the type of preemption defense put forth by 
PLIVA, Inc. is that of conflict preemption.96  While the Court explained “an 
express statement of preemption is always preferable, the absence of such a 
statement” should not lead to a finding for no express preemption, but 
instead to the possibility of conflict preemption.97  Specifically, the Court 
narrowed the type of conflict preemption to that of impossibility.98 
 
89. See PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2576. 
90. Id. 
91. Id.  The FDA provides that this duty of notification exists in 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2) and 21 
C.F.R. § 201.57(e).  Id.  They attempt to persuade the Court that failure to notify the FDA of 
“unsafe dosage or methods or duration of administration or application, in such manner and form, 
as are necessary for the protection of users” results in a medication which is misbranded and 
therefore a violation of federal law.  Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2)). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 2577. 
94. Id. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. 
97. Id. at 2577 n.4. 
98. Id. at 2577. 
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Mensing and Demahy argued that when a private manufacturer’s 
capacity to comply with state law depends on endorsement and aid from the 
FDA, proving preemption requires the company to reveal the FDA would 
not have permitted compliance.99  Asserting that the generic drug manufact-
urers of metoclopramide never attempted to even initiate the process of 
FDA approval, Mensing and Demahy argued PLIVA, Inc. did not meet its 
burden of proof.100  The Court rejected their argument and held the question 
for impossibility “is whether the private party could independently do under 
federal law what state law requires of it.”101 
To support its conclusion, the Court looked to the non obstante 
provision of the Supremacy Clause within the United States Constitution.102  
Specifically, it emphasized that to consider the actions of third and 
unrelated parties when determining preemption would be inconsistent with 
the non obstante provision.103  This non obstante clause discourages 
analysis and speculation about the various ways third-party actions could 
potentially reconcile conflicting federal and state laws.104  Therefore, the 
Court held when the “ordinary meaning” of a law stops a party from 
“independently” complying with both state and federal law, a preemption 
defense will succeed.105 
3. Distinguishing Wyeth:  Generic Drug Recipients Dealt an 
Unfortunate Hand 
In Wyeth, a name-brand manufacturing company responsible for 
injuries to recipients who did not receive adequate warning argued state tort 
claims were preempted by federal FDA laws.106  The United States 
Supreme Court disagreed with the company in 2009, holding it was 
possible for the name-brand manufacturing company to comply with both 
laws.107  The Court’s rationale for this seemingly contradictory opinion in 
PLIVA, Inc. lies in the name-brand manufacturer’s ability to complete CBE 
processes to strengthen their warning labels.108  Because Wyeth, as a brand-
name manufacturer, could unilaterally and independently strengthen their 
warning labels, it was not impossible for them to comply with both state 
 
99. Id. at 2578-79. 
100. Id. at 2579. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 2579-80 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
103. Id. at 2580. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193-94 (2009). 
107. Id. at 1204. 
108. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2581-82. 
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and federal laws.109  The Court “acknowledge[d] the unfortunate hand” 
dealt to Mensing and Demahy, but explained it cannot unilaterally change 
FDA regulations.110  The Court suggested, “‘it is not this Court’s task to 
decide whether the statutory scheme established by Congress is unusual or 
even bizarre.’”111 
B. THE DISSENT:  “THIS OUTCOME MAKES LITTLE SENSE” 
Justice Sotomayor authored the dissent in PLIVA, Inc., in which 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined.112  The disagreements 
surrounding the legal foundation of this case become evident throughout the 
dissent, beginning with the statement, “[t]he Court gets one thing right: 
[t]his outcome ‘makes little sense.’”113  Continuing its strong sentiments, 
the dissent further suggested that, as a result of the PLIVA, Inc. opinion, 
whether a drug recipient harmed by inadequate warning labels can receive 
the protection of the law now “turns solely on the happenstance of whether 
her pharmacist filled her prescription with a brand-name or generic 
drug.”114  The dissent discussed the issues of congressional intent, the 
demanding requirements of an impossibility test, and the impact of 
Wyeth.115 
1. The Silence of Congress:  What is Congressional Intent? 
The dissent contended when analyzing a preemption case, the role of 
the Court is to identify the clear and manifest purpose of Congress and give 
priority consideration to those purposes identified.116  While Congress has 
demonstrated a long-time interest in state tort litigation against drug 
manufacturers,117 the states have traditionally regulated health and safety 
matters.118  Therefore, in health and safety concerns, the Court considers the 
 
109. Id. at 2581. 
110. Id. at 2581-82. 
111. Id. at 2582 (quoting Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2733 
(2009)). 
112. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
113. Id. at 2583. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 2583-93. 
116. Id. at 2586.  “[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress . . . .  [T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”  
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). 
117. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1196 (2009). 
118. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. 
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longstanding balance of power between Congress and the states in 
determining congressional intent.119 
Given the traditional roles of state and federal government, the dissent 
recognized Congress has not used express language to preempt state tort 
law actions against generic or name-brand drug manufacturers.120  
Specifically, when Congress amended the FDCA in 1962, it took efforts to 
preserve state law.121  As additional proof of congressional intent in 1962, 
Congress had previously enacted an express preemption provision for 
medical devices,122 but did not include a similar provision in the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments, which pertain to the issue in PLIVA, Inc.123  
Therefore, the dissent argued “Congress’ ‘silence on the issue . . . is 
powerful evidence that [it] did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive 
means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.’”124  Without congress-
ional intent of superseding state law, the dissent believed the manufacturing 
company’s preemption defense was significantly weakened.125 
2. Preemption:  A Demanding Defense 
Additionally, the dissent noted the difficult burden proving 
impossibility as it “‘is a demanding defense.’”126  As a traditional 
affirmative defense, a defendant bears the burden of proof127 to illustrate the 
party cannot comply with both state and federal law.128  Given this burden 
of proof, the dissent highlighted past preemption standards used by the 
United States Supreme Court bar the use of the preemption defense for 
hypothetical or potentially conflicting laws.129  Therefore, the dissent 
suggested because the possibility of impossibility is not enough to warrant a 
preemption defense, the manufacturing company has at most demonstrated 
a hypothetical conflict and failed to meet its burden of proof.130 
 
119. See PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2586 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
123. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2586 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. at 2586-87 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009)). 
125. Id. at 2587. 
126. Id. (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199). 
127. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984). 
128. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). 
129. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2587 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes 
Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992).  “The existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is 
insufficient to warrant” preemption.  Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982). 
130. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2587-88 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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3. Interpreting Wyeth:  Overruled or Not? 
In addition to the dissent claiming that preemption was an invalid 
defense in PLIVA, Inc., the dissent contended the majority incorrectly 
determined the current 2011 ruling does not impact the 2009 ruling in 
Wyeth.131  Instead, the dissent focused on the holding in Wyeth, which 
requires manufacturers show the FDA would not have approved a label 
change.132  In contrast, the dissenters reasoned the majority overrules Wyeth 
and does not require PLIVA, Inc. to meet the same standard of proof as 
name-brand manufacturing company in Wyeth.133  Additionally, the dissent 
highlighted that it is possible for a generic drug manufacturing company to 
successfully utilize a preemption defense once they have proposed a 
warning label change to the FDA and that proposal has been denied.134  
These discrepancies led the dissent to conclude the majority “invents new 
principles of pre-emption law out of thin air to justify its dilution of the 
impossibility standard.”135 
IV. IMPACT 
The decision of PLIVA, Inc. will undoubtedly affect future prescription 
drug recipients, the companies who produce those drugs, the prescribing 
physicians, the distributing pharmacists, and the discussion of FDA 
regulations in Congress.136  Given that generic drugs account for seventy-
five percent of the prescription drugs distributed in the United States, this 
decision impacts millions nationwide.137  Unfortunately, the other millions 
of United States citizens who take generic drugs with inadequate warning 
labels will have no legal remedy or restitution.138  An activist group, the 
Alliance for Justice notes, “What’s at stake?  Keeping pharmaceutical 
companies honest about the potential danger their drugs pose.”139 
Aside from a sweeping change in a colossal portion of the nation’s 
health care, PLIVA, Inc. neglects to determine if generic drug manufacturers 
 
131. Id. at 2582. 
132. Id. at 2588. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 2588-89. 
135. Id. at 2582. 
136. See id. at 2572 (majority opinion) (holding those who receive generic medications 
cannot sue in tort for inadequate warning labels). 
137. David W. Freeman, Generic Drug Ruling May Effect Millions:  What Did The Supreme 
Court Say, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-20073825-10391704.html 
(last updated June 23, 2011). 
138. Id. 
139. PLIVA, Inc. v Mensing, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-
issues/the-corporate-court/pliva-inc-v-mensing.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2011). 
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have a duty to report dangers to the FDA.140  Furthermore, the opinion 
creates a division in the protection of law provided to citizens, leaving those 
who receive generic drugs instead of name-brand drugs potentially injured 
with no legal solution.141  The majority also calls upon Congress to enact 
the changes that are necessary to avoid additional seemingly irrational 
decisions, unleashing a nationwide debate among politicians, corporations, 
and lobbyists.142  However, the impact of the decision extends beyond 
congressional politics and into the lives of North Dakota prescription drug 
recipients.143 
A. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS:  GENERIC MANUFACTURER’S DUTY TO 
THE FDA 
The issue remains unresolved with regard to a generic drug 
manufacturer’s duty to warn the FDA that the labeling on their medications 
may not be strong enough or accurate.144  While the potential duty is an 
important consideration for the safety of the millions of people who use 
prescription drugs every day, it also leaves the duty of the drug 
manufacturing companies ambiguous.145  The American Association for 
Justice (AAJ) called the decision a “disastrous outcome for patient 
safety.”146  The AAJ continued that the Supreme Court decision eliminates 
any incentive for manufacturers of generic medications to verify the safety 
of their products.147  In the view of the AAJ, less motivation to ensure the 
safety of generic products becomes especially relevant when ten extremely 
popular drugs are scheduled to be “coming off patent within the next few 
years.”148 
Due to the Supreme Court’s ambiguity, many individuals and 
organizations have begun advocating for clarification of the duty to report, 
including the consumer advocacy group Public Citizen.149  Public Citizen 
 
140. See PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2577. 
141. See id. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
142. Id. at 2582 (majority opinion). 
143. Hoeven Launches the North Dakota Prescription Drug Guide, FDA.GOV (Apr. 6, 
2004), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04n0115/04n-0115-ts00041-02.htm.  Since 
2004, former North Dakota Governor John Hoeven has focused efforts to ensure citizens have 
information available regarding affordability of prescription medications, including generic 
options for medications.  Id. 
144. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2577. 
145. Id. 
146. 2 FRANK C. WOODSIDE, III, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 14.04 (2011). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Pat Murphy, Consumer Group Asks FDA to Revise Generic Drug Warnings, LAWYERS 
WEEKLY USA, Sept. 12, 2011. 
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intends to persuade the FDA to authorize generic drug manufactures to edit 
or strengthen their warning label mechanisms.150  As previously mentioned, 
some manufacturers currently have permission to use avenues to change 
their warning labels such as CBE and prior-approval-supplement 
procedures.151  Private Citizen recommends the FDA extend CBE or prior-
approval-supplement procedure permissions to all manufacturers, name-
brand and generic.152  In addition, the organization urges the FDA to further 
clarify a generic drug manufacturers’ duty to report possible dangers 
associated with a medication not found on drug labeling.153 
B. THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
 “It raises some eyebrows when the U.S. Supreme Court accepts review 
of a case, the principle issue of which has not divided the federal circuit 
Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Solicitor General recommends that the 
Court deny certiorari.”154  Despite the questions regarding the Court’s 
acceptance of this seemingly already decided case, the PLIVA, Inc. ruling 
creates a distinction between those who receive generic medications versus 
those who receive name-brand medications.155  While the dissent suggests 
this distinction between name-brand and generic medications places the 
applicability of the law in the hands of a pharmacist,156 others suggest the 
ruling creates a stronger dichotomy between those who can afford to pay 
for name-brand prescription medications and those who cannot.157  
“Mensing’s attorneys said . . . [the] decision creates two different classes of 
patients—those who take name-brand drugs and those who take generics—
and that generic users are now less safe.”158 
It has long been recognized that access to the justice system can be 
costly.  Until this opinion, decades of United States Supreme Court 
opinions have intended to apply the law fairly to people regardless of their 
socioeconomic status.  Arguably, this ruling forces society to return to a day 






154. WOODSIDE, supra note 146, § 14.04. 
155. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2582 (2011). 
156. Id. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
157. See generally Jeremy Herb, Court Sides with Generic Drugmakers, STAR TRIB., June 
23, 2011 (explaining prescription drug recipients emerge into two groups, those who pay for 
name-brand prescriptions and those who receive generic prescriptions). 
158. Id. 
159. See generally id. (explaining future legal protection will only be available to the class of 
citizens receiving name-grand medications). 
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prescription drug recipients are aware of the potential savings associated 
with generic medications, few understand the use of generic drugs is 
encroaching upon their legal rights.160 
C. SAFETY IN THE HANDS OF CONGRESS 
Although both the majority opinion and the dissent recognized the 
PLIVA, Inc. decision is unfair for the recipients of generic medications, 
both acknowledged the power to fix this unfair dichotomy lies in the hands 
of Congress.161  Accordingly, this opinion has sparked numerous interests 
in congressional representatives and the executive branch.162  Reuters 
reports “[t]he Obama administration supported the two women. It said the 
companies could have sought changes to the drug’s label.”163  From a 
legislative standpoint, Representative Henry Waxman, ranking member of 
the House Energy and Commerce Committee, indicates he will strive to 
create the system Congress intended to originally establish through the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments.164  He contends “[c]onsumers need to have 
every confidence that generic drugs are the same as brand drugs.”165 
Without question, the actions taken by Congress in response to this 
decision will increase prescription drug safety166 and impact future state tort 
litigation.167  In 1982, when the FDA initially approved the policies 
allowing manufacturers to unilaterally change their warning labels, it is 
unlikely they accurately predicted the impact the 1984 Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments would have in the growth, demand, and popularity of generic 
drugs over the next thirty years.168  Therefore, many are likely to see no 
reason why the FDA should not consider changing the current CBE policy 
 
160. Tom Lamb, Public Citizen Group Files FDA Petition To Fix Problems Exposed by 
Mensing Case Ruling, DRUG INJURY WATCH (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.drug-injury.com/ 
druginjurycom/2011/09/public-citizen-petition-fda-generic-drug-manufacturers-warnings-side-
effects-mensing-supreme-court.html. 
161. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2582. 
162. Key Congressman Urges Actions on High Court’s Mensing Ruling, 28 GENERIC LINE, 
no. 17, Aug. 31, 2011, available at LexisNexis; James Vicini, Supreme Court Rejects Generic 
Drugs Labeling Suits, REUTERS, June 23, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/23/us-
genericdrugs-labeling-warning-idUSTRE75M3RT20110623 (last updated June 23, 2011). 
163. Vicini, supra note 162. 
164. Key Congressman Urges Actions on High Court’s Mensing Ruling, supra note 162. 
165. Id. 
166. See generally Ben Moscovitch, FDA Regulatory Changes Sought To Reverse Generic 
Labeling Ruling, 17 FDA WEEK, no. 35, Sept. 2, 2011 (explaining current CBE standards, enacted 
in 1982, inffectively address modern prescription medication concerns). 
167. See generally Attorneys Discuss State of Litigation Surrounding Zoloft & SSRIs, TORTS 
AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW COMMUNITY BLOG, Aug. 24, 2011, available at LexisNexis 
(explaining many attorneys involved in potential litigation of Zoloft and other medications based 
their strategy and timing decisions on the PLIVA, Inc. decision). 
168. Id. 
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to allow generic manufacturers the same privileges as name-brand 
manufacturers.169  If, in the future, Congress loosens the requirements for 
the FDA’s CBE policy, the application of PLIVA, Inc. in future tort cases 
will decrease significantly.170  Specifically, all manufacturers will fall into 
the Wyeth holding, which disallows preemption, rather than the PLIVA, Inc. 
holding for granting impossibility to only generic manufacturers.171  Until 
then, attorneys nationwide looking to initiate massive products liability 
cases will likely file suit against name-brand producers, but they may wait, 
refrain, or decline filing suit against possibly preempted generic 
manufacturers.172 
D. NORTH DAKOTA DRUG RECIPIENTS 
The safety and efficacy of prescription drugs impacts all recipients, 
including those in the Midwest.173  In particular, North Dakota citizens 
utilize a higher volume of prescription drugs than the national average.174  
Accordingly, the North Dakota law currently views products liability as a 
rapidly expanding area of law, which will require frequent treatment from 
the courts and the legislature.175  Prior to PLIVA, Inc., North Dakota law 
addressing products liability preemption was governed by the Eighth 
Circuit’s ruling, which did not distinguish name-brand and generic 
manufacturers.176  Therefore, current North Dakota statutes define a 
manufacturer without drawing a distinction between those who produce 
name-brand versus generic drugs.177  In response to PLIVA, Inc., North 
 
169. Id. 
170. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1208 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011) (holding the current CBE policy makes it 
impossible for PLIVA, Inc. to change their warning labels). 
171. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1208 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
at 2572. 
172. Attorneys Discuss State of Litigation Surrounding Zoloft & SSRIs, supra note 167 
(explaining the state of litigation surrounding drugs which may cause psychological disorders 
which are produced in a name-brand and generic version). 
173. See, e.g., AARP KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, STATE HEATH CARE BRIEF (June 2009), 
available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/state_hcb_09_nd.pdf.  “In 2005, about [fifty-
seven percent] of prescriptions for North Dakota residents were filed with generics.”  Id. 
174. Id. 
175. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-07(2) (1995).  “In recent years it has become 
increasingly evident that there are still serious problems with the current civil justice system.  As a 
result, there is an urgent need for additional legislation to establish clear and predictable rules with 
respect to certain matters relating to products liability actions.”  Id. 
176. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 612 (8th Cir. 2009). 
177. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-01(1). 
 “Manufacturer” means a person or entity who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces, 
constructs, or otherwise prepares a product or a component part of a product prior to the 
sale of the product to a user or consumer. The term includes any seller of a product who is 
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Dakota’s legislature will likely define what constitutes a generic 
manufacturer.178  Supporting the likelihood of this projected change, North 
Dakota legislative committees, such as the Health Care Reform Review 
Committee, are currently addressing a variety of health concerns related to 
North Dakota citizens and will continue these discussions until 2013.179 
In addition to changes with regard to products liability analysis, North 
Dakota courts will begin to construe their conflict preemption analysis with 
regard to the defense of impossibility in compliance with PLIVA, Inc.180  
While the North Dakota Supreme Court has recently decided a federal 
preemption case,181 they must now consider how the “ordinary meaning” of 
a law stops a party from “independently” complying with both state and 
federal law.182 
V. CONCLUSION 
In PLIVA, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held federal FDA 
regulations preempted state tort law regarding the warning labels produced 
by generic drug manufacturers.183  With this ruling, the Court rewrites an 
important test for impossibility, a type of conflict preemption.  While the 
impacts of the changes in this test remain uncertain, for now, those generic 
drug recipients who have been injured because of inadequate warning labels 
have been dealt an “unfortunate hand” by the United States Supreme Court. 
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